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Abstract This paper presents some factors and explores the strategies utilized by companies for 
influencing the standardization process in mobile telecommunication. The paper is based on an in-
depth case-study of the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA). In the paper I divide the companies into 
different types; Operators, Manufactures and application vendors and establish some common 
strategies used by the different type of actors. I find that the operators and the large manufacturers 
have a vertical approach where they try to influence every part of the value chain/domain they are 
part of. They would like to control everything from the core infrastructure to the services running 
on top of it and work together in many standardization organizations to uphold this control. The 
application vendors have a horizontal approach. The majority of application vendors have no hope 
of dominating the whole value chain they are a part of and rather opt for a part in many different 
value chains. Since their products are more adoptable they tend to be present in standardization 
within more domains/value chains. 
The operators are most influenced by time-to-market, the manufacturers by 
IPR and the application vendors by customer relationship. They are all 
concerned with alliance building 
. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
One set of strategic decisions actors in the mobile telecommunication sector have to decide on are 
if they want to standardize their products and services and if so, where they want to pursue their 
standardization work. The mobile telecommunication infrastructure is a highly standardized 
infrastructure, and the market where new telecommunication services are introduced is a global 
many-sided market. In this setting the development of new infrastructure enhancement and services 
are in need of some degree of coordination. Coordination can be achieved through standardization 
or through the direct influence of one dominant actor. The actors like operators, manufactures, 
content providers and IT providers have their own business goals and different attitude towards 
openness and standardization depending on factors like size, primary markets and place in the 
value chain. Even if the mobile market is perceived as a global market, the markets in the U.S. 
Europe and Asia differs (Zhang and Prybutok 2005). In Europe there are no dominant pan-
European operators (Maitland, Bauer et al. 2002; Whally and Curwen 2006). Standardization is 
then the most likely tool for a coordinated introduction of new mobile services in Europe.  
The economic literature on standardization is primarily concerned with the choice of standards in 
the market and the competition between different existing standards (David and Greenstein 1990). 
The literature has divided the standards broadly into de facto standards and committee standards, 
and not been particularly concerned with how the standards have come into existence. 
This paper will look at the strategic behavior of different actors in creating standards within a 
standardization organization. The paper is based on an in-depth case study of the Open Mobile 
Alliance, the premium standardization consortium for new mobile services. The question the paper 
will address is: “What strategies do different actors pursue in their quest for new mobile services, 
and what factors influence their involvement?”   
One finding from the study is that companies involvement in standardization is not pure technical 
but also have a strategic aim of promoting themselves towards their peers. The paper argues that a 
broad set of factors influence companies involvement in standardization and many of these factors 
are applicable for a set of strategies. The paper also shows that different actor groups have different 
strategies and aims towards standardization membership. The paper argues that the manufacturers 
see membership in standardization as a starting point for their product development and also 
engage in other vertical activities in their value chain, while the IT vendors see membership as a 
horizontal activity and engage in the same part of different value chains. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next chapter the literature on the strategic options 
available for companies in pursuing standardization and the factors influencing their choices are 
presented.  Then the case of the Open Mobile Alliance will be introduced followed by the findings 
from the study. Finally there is a discussion of the findings and a conclusion chapter. 
2 STRATEGIES FOR STANDARDIZATION PARTICIPATION 
Participation in standardization can be viewed as an aspect of the product development process, 
when a company is involved in a market with network effects (Weiss and Sirbu 1990). A 
fundamental assumption in the economic literature on standards is the notion of network effects.  A 
network effect exist when the value a user derives from the consumption of a goods or service is 
dependent on the number of other users of that product or service (Katz and Shapiro 1985). 
Network effects are complementary relationships in value creation among adopters of a common 
standard (Stango 2004).  
The overarching strategic decision firms must decide on is whether to engage in a standards battle 
(war) with other competing technologies or to agree on a common standard up front. The first is 
often labeled de facto standardization, while the latter is labeled de jure or committee 
standardization.  
From the literature on strategic positioning of firms in where and how to standardize a “new” 
product in a network or many-sided market (Katz and Shapiro 1986; Arthur 1989; David and 
Greenstein 1990; Weiss and Sirbu 1990; Farrell and Saloner 1992; Besen and Farrell 1994; Katz 
and Shapiro 1994; Grindley 1995; Shapiro and Varian 1999) the following general strategies can be 
extracted: 
• De facto standardization through market domination. 
• Licensing in on existing technology 
• Develop converters or gateways between technologies 
• Create informal alliances with other firms 
• Create formal alliances with other firms that have restricted or open membership 
• Join an open standardization organization 
It is not an either or for companies, but the choices follow a continuum from de facto market 
standardization by one firm on one side to formal committee standardization on the other side, see 
figure below. 
De facto standardization is often pursued by companies that have a dominating market position. 
The company will often have a technological leadership in its domain. Factors for this strategy are 
strong property rights, technological leadership, ability to innovate, large resources, strong 
differentiation, early entrant (first-mover advantage), large installed base, presence in 
complementary products or attracting the producers of complements and brand name and 
reputation (Besen and Farrell 1994; Grindley 1995; Shapiro and Varian 1999). 
Licensing in on existing technology is often the choice of late entrants into the market where the 
company do not possess strong technological know-how or would like to avoid a standards war 
(Grindley 1995). Licensing can also be a strategy for the dominant actor to attract more producers 
and strengthening the standard (Chiesa, Manzini et al. 2002). 
Converters or gateways can be effective tools to create compatibility between products (Farrell and 
Saloner 1992; Hanseth 2001). Instead of going head-to-head the companies choose to make their 
products compatible with their competitors through converters or through gateway systems. This 
avoids a standards war and utilizes the installed base of both products.  
If a company do not possess the market power or resources to unilaterally set the standard it can 
choose to ally with other to create a standard up front. It can form informal alliances with other 
firms to enlarge the total market power or get access to complementary products that will 
strengthen the standard (Besen and Farrell 1994; Shapiro and Varian 1999). The next step is to 
create a more formal alliance with other companies. In the telecommunication sector we can se this 
in the standardization of operating systems for handsets where some large manufactures have 
Figure 1- The continuum of options available for companies in pursuing standardization 
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established the Symbian alliance to counter for the de facto standardization by Microsoft (Iversen 
and Tee 2006) and in the establishment of new short range air interfaces with the Bluetooth alliance 
(Keil 2002). 
In creating alliances firms are influenced by a range of factors. Some factors that influence their 
choice are: Size of alliance, number of close rivals present, presence of companies with compatible 
products, market power of alliance and the active support and promotion by members (Weiss and 
Sirbu 1990; Axelrod, Mitchell et al. 1995). One factor that does not seem to influence the choice of 
technology in development of cooperative standards is the installed base (Weiss and Sirbu 1990). 
Factors that influence the standard setting process within an alliance or a standard organization are 
the IPR of companies, the presence of complimentary products, timing of the standardization 
process, the active involvement of companies in producing written specifications, strength of the 
alliance and market power of buyers involved in the standardization (Weiss and Sirbu 1990; 
Grindley 1995; Shapiro and Varian 1999; Jakobs, Procter et al. 2001; Chiesa, Manzini et al. 2002).  
It is futile to draw a strict line between the factors influencing and strategies used by firms in the 
different standardization cases but some factors and strategies seem to function well in a standards 
war while others work better in cooperative anticipatory standardization. Some common factors 
influencing all type of standardization process are IPR, timing of the introduction of products or 
service based on the standard, the power and the reputation of the companies backing a standard, 
pricing of products and services based on the standard and the availability of complementary 
products for the standard. Some factors that seem to differ between standards wars settings and 
anticipatory standardization are installed base, ability to innovate and technological leadership. 
Factors that influence only the development of anticipatory standards are the buying power of the 
companies involved, and the involvement in written contributions to the standard from the 
companies.   
3 THE OPEN MOBILE ALLIANCE 
This study is based on an in-depth case study of the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA). The data was 
gathered through a mixed methods approach (Creswell 2003), consisting of participatory 
observation in the standardization meetings from October 2006 until December 2007, 15 interviews 
with the participants and studies of membership documents from OMA, W3C, 3GPP and 3GPP2.  
The goal in this paper is to present some of the factors that influence the behavior of OMA 
members and see how this factors influence their strategies towards membership, both within OMA 
and towards other standardization organizations. 
Figure 2 - OMAs place in the standardization world 
OMA is a consortium with a goal of developing standards for 3G services. The standards that 
OMA develops fit in on the service level of the mobile infrastructure. OMA develops both 
standards for end user services like MMS, IM, and mobile broadcasting, operator oriented services 
like device management and data synchronization and content services like DRM and content 
distribution. OMAs work fits on top of the work done by 3GPP and 3GPP2 and get input from 
standardization organizations like W3C and IETF and interest organizations like GSMA and CDG, 
see figure 2. 
OMA brings together all the actors of the mobile industry, both new and old, and is therefore an 
interesting organization to study if one should learn more about how new actors influence the 
standardization work or how new standards are being shaped by an enlarged industry domain. 
According to Tilson and Lyytinen (2006) the battles over different mobile standards have moved 
from the air interfaces to higher level interfaces (services) and become more important. The major 
actor in this area is OMA. 
OMA is a large standardization organization with more than 400 members. OMA is a public 
organization and must have a board of directors and a yearly general assembly where the members 
for the board are elected. The board of directors is the top level in OMA and is in charge of running 
OMA. The Board of directors has delegated the responsibility of the technical work to the technical 
plenary. The technical plenary oversees the technical work, endorses and approves new work items 
and technical specifications. The actual work is done by working groups. This is similar to other 
large standardization organizations in the telecommunication domain like 3GPP and ITU-T.  
The members can choose from four different membership categories; sponsor, full, associate and 
supporter. The influence of the different member categories vary. One first decision for a firm is 
what member level they shall choose. The rights of members can be divided into leadership 
activities and technical activities. The leadership activities can be further divided into possibility 
for board membership, chair technical work, participates in votes and act as vice chair or chair sub 
working groups. The technical activities can be divided into contribute technical requirements, 
provide review comments, participate in the technical plenary, approve or support new work items 
and participate in the OMA interoperability testing. The following table shows some of the benefits 
of the different member categories in OMA. 
 
Membership rights Sponsor Full Associate Supporter 
Can be elected to the board of directors  ALL Y N N 
Can sit on committees Y Y N N 
Can chair technical work Y Y N N 
Can be vice chair or chair sub groups Y Y Y N 
Can contribute requirements Y Y Y N 
Can provide review comments Y Y Y Y 
Can participate in technical plenary Y Y Y N 
Can initiate and support a work item Y Y Y N 
Can approve work item Y Y N N 
Can participate in OMA interoperability tests Y Y Y Y 
Table 1 - Overview of the OMA membership rights 
Firms being on the board of directors have more options to influence the overall direction of OMA 
than other companies. The same goes for companies that acts as chairs or editors for the technical 
plenary or the work groups. The sponsors automatically get one board member. This is the only 
difference in rights between sponsors and full members.  
Sponsors, full and associate members can participate in the technical plenary but only sponsors and 
full members can vote. Sponsors and full members can approve new work and new specifications. 
They are the ones that have the final say in what to do and the approval of the standards. The 
associate members can participate in the working groups and thereby influence the work during the 
whole specification process. The only rights of the supporters are to be able to test their products 
for interoperability and get access to pre-publication drafts and comment them in the review 
process. Sponsor and full members can influence both the strategic direction of OMA as well as the 
content of the standards, while the associate members can influence the technical work but have not 
much influence in the strategic direction of OMA as a whole.  
OMA also divides their members according to what type of company they are; Operator, 
manufacturer, IT/application vendor or other (Government, research, consulting, finance and 
content providers). This distinction will be used in this paper.  
4 FINDINGS AND DATA ANALYSIS 
In this chapter some factors that are influencing companies strategic behavior within OMA are 
presented, and these factors are linked to the type of membership the different groups choose. The 
overlap in membership with 3GPP/3GPP2 and W3C are also presented. This is to illustrate the 
strategies for cooperation the different groups choose. The numbers are from July 2007. 
From the interviews, observation and document studies the following factors have emerged as 
important to the strategic behavior of firms within OMA.  
• Intellectual property rights (IPR). This is the single most important factor steering the strategic 
behavior of firms. Getting your IPR into a specification means that you can charge for your IPR 
or use the IPR as a trading factor with other firms.  
• Time to market. Getting the standard ready in time is important. Introducing a new service is 
crucial for the operators.  Introducing a service too early can mean that the customers are not 
ready and the equipment and content are missing. Introducing a service too late can mean that 
some other service or firm is taking the market. 
• Consensus and alliance building. To get a solutions through you must get a 2/3 support for it. 
OMA has a formal voting procedure, but much of the work is based on consensus. Firms have 
to make alliances and strive for general consensus to get a solution approved.  
• Customer relationship. This is a strange factor for standardization, but many companies 
participate in this standardization activity to get close to their customers. In the 
telecommunication sector the main buyers of products based on the developed standards are the 
operators and the handset manufacturers. So in this case the customers, the end-users of the 
products also participate in the standardization process. Participating in standardization 
organizations where their customers also participate is viewed by many as a good way to market 
their products and services. 
Members can take on different roles and positions within OMA. Having a board members is 
viewed strategic important by the members. The role of chair of the technical plenary or a work 
group is also important for the members. The first can influence the long term direction of the 
organization while the latter can influence the technical content of the standards produced.  
Being a sponsor yields most influence but is also the most expensive option. You can also become 
a board member as a full member, but then you have to compete with other full members for the 
position. Only sponsor and full membership gives a position to influence both the overall direction 
of the standardization and the technical content of the standards developed. Having the right to vote 
is important for firms that want to block proposals or get their specific requirements into a 
specification. Having the right to approve work items can set the direction of the future work of the 
organization. Being able to support a work item can give influence in the creation stage of new 
work. The chairs influence the work by setting the agenda and steering the face-to-face meetings. 
Their influence can be quit decisive for the outcome of a standard.  
Choice of membership type 
Here we look at what type of membership the different actor groups choose. Their choice of 
membership level can be viewed in accordance with the strategic factors they see most important. 
There are 17 sponsor members in OMA 5 operators, 11 manufacturers and 1 IT/application 
provider. If you look at the total of sponsor and full members you have 37 operators, 44 
manufacturers, 32 application vendors and 4 others. Operators, manufacturers and application 
vendors have all more than 25 % of the total membership in the organization each.  
If we look at the groups that can not vote, hold a chair or have a board member the distribution of 
type of companies is the following: Only one small operator chose not to have full voting rights, 11 
% are manufacturers, most of which are smaller Asian firms, 14 % are classified as others 
including many consulting and testing firms while the majority (74%) are IT/application vendors 
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Figure 3- Distribution of membership between types of companies in OMA 
The difference between the distributions is striking. Almost ¾ of the companies that choose to 
participate in the development process but not in the strategic direction of the organization or in the 
final voting are IT/application vendors.   
Overlap in membership with other standardization organizations 
Creating alliances can also take place outside of OMA. Many companies have a large participation 
in standardization and they meet in other settings. Here we look at the overlap in membership with 
the telecommunication organizations 3GPP and 3GPP2 and the IT standardization organization 
W3C. This can tell us something about which direction companies tend to focus on, IT or core 
telecommunications. 3GPP and 3GPP2 are in charge of standardizing the infrastructure which 
OMA is building services on top of. W3C is creating services for the Internet infrastructure, but 
these services should also be available for the mobile communication infrastructure. One have 
focus on services in an adjacent realm while the two others have focus on the technical part of the 
underlying infrastructure.  
Below is the distribution per type of company of OMA members participation in W3C and 
3GPP/3GPP2 presented. In total more than 77 percent of the full and sponsor members in OMA 
participate in 3GPP, 3GPP2 or W3C. The numbers show that over 90 percent of the operators are 
members in 3GPP/3GPP2 while only 20 percent are members in W3C. The numbers are similar for 
the manufacturers where 80 percent are members in 3GPP/3GPP2 while only 25 percent is 
members in W3C. The numbers for the IT/application vendors are different. Here over 40 percent 
of the members are members of 3GPP/3GPP2 and over 40 percent is members of W3C. 
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Figure 4- Oma members participation in 3GPP/3GPP2 and W3C 
If we go deeper into the numbers we can see that all the operators and manufacturers that are 
members of W3C are also members of 3GPP/3GPP2. 25 percent of the application vendors are 
members of both W3C and 3GPP/3GPP2. Going behind the numbers we see that all sponsor 
members are member of 3GPP, while 64 percent are members of 3GPP2 and 70 percent are 
members of W3C. This indicates that the sponsor members have broad standardization 
participation. 
If we look at the number of associate companies that are members of other organizations the 
numbers are low. Only 18 percent of the associate members participate in 3GPP, 3GPP2 or W3C.   
5 DISCUSSION 
It is natural that different types of firms choose different strategies within a standardization 
organization. Large companies with a lot of IPR would like to influence both the strategic direction 
of the organization and the concrete content of the standards. Smaller more specialized firms would 
like to influence the content of standards within their domain and make sure that work is started in 
their domain. The first group would be inclined to be a sponsor member while the latter would 
rather look towards an associate membership. Firms that shall apply the standards would like to 
influence the processes and the overall content of the standards and not focus on the technical 
content in detail. This would lead towards a full membership.  
IPR 
IPR is an issue both in competition between and within standards (Shapiro and Varan 1999). IPR 
has played a large role in the development of both the 2G and 3G mobile infrastructures (Bekkers, 
Verspagen et al. 2002; Goodman and Myers 2005). In both cases some companies have dominated 
the process by introducing their IPR into the process. The large manufacturers are the ones that use 
IPR as a general tool in the development of standards and can negotiate standards by having a large 
amount of IPR that they can trade with. The smaller more specialized companies try to get their 
IPR into specific standards and do not have the bargaining or trading power of the larger 
companies.  
The manufacturers are the group that has the technological power and IPR towards the core 
product. As we can see from the numbers the manufacturers position themselves both in OMA and 
in 3GPP/3GPP2. This is because they need active involvement to get their IPR into the standards. 
Without their active involvement the organization might choose a competitors technology instead. 
It seems like they stick to their core competence in telecommunication and hope for others to bring 
the complementary products into the standard. They do not involve themselves to much in 
activities in adjacent infrastructures. 
The application providers that can be viewed as having complementary product knowledge are on 
the other hand interested in getting their complementary knowledge applied in more settings. For 
them it can be more beneficial to get their products into more infrastructures. 
The operators who are the buyers are interested in getting a fair price for the end product and 
competition between different providers. All in all the different groups act according to the general 
literatures perspective of the importance of IPR (Weiss and Sirbu 1990; Grindley 1995; Shapiro 
and Varian 1999). 
Time to market 
The introduction of new mobile services is dependent on right timing (Steinbock 2005) and the 
coordination of the different actors (Lindmark, Bohlin et al. 2004). The operators are the one with 
most focus on this aspect. They are the ones to introduce the new services to the end-user. But 
without the support of the content providers and the manufacturers the service will not likely 
succeed. Within OMA the manufacturer are the ones pushing for fast development of standards and 
the one with the closest contact with the end-user. For many operators it is more important to get a 
service out on the right time than the technical content of the standard. For the manufactures and 
application vendors it is more a case of getting the technical part of the standard to their liking and 
thereby delaying the development time of a standard. An example of this is the development of the 
converged IP messaging standard in OMA where the operators are pushing for a phased 
development of the standards so they can introduce some services earlier while the manufacturers 
and application vendors want a slower and more complete development.  
Timing of a standard is most crucial for the operators. They have to introduce new services in 
competition from Internet and broadcasting services. Here there is a competition between 
standards. Being to late might jeopardize the introduction of the whole service and let another 
standard win. Factors like installed base, access to complementary products and reputation is 
crucial for the operators. In some sense the manufacturers can be viewed as providing a 
complementary product to the service, but it is really a core component because the services would 
not work without handsets. The manufacturers need to have a production line ready so they can 
provide the operators with products. They compete between themselves. The first one to get a 
product ready might get a large share of the market from the operators. The application providers 
are again more on the complementary side, providing products to the operators.  
The members in OMA adhere to the insights that to succeed in standardization you have to attract 
complementary products and time your standard right (Grindley 1995; Shapiro and Varian 1999). 
Consensus and alliance building 
Building personal and intra firm relationships is important for the actors in the telecommunication 
sector (Grundström and Wilkinson 2004). The actors in these domains tend to be experienced 
individuals that participate in many organizations (Jakobs, Procter et al. 2001).  
In an organization like OMA where all actors are included, the companies can use the same 
strategies and mechanisms within the organization that they use for choosing where to standardize 
and whom to form alliances with between organizations.  
Factors influencing the choice of alliance partner are the size of the alliance and the number of 
close rivals (Axelrod, Mitchell et al. 1995). Within OMA the operators are not in direct competition 
with each other, they operate in different markets and can introduce the same service (standard) in 
different markets. Operators need to ally with the manufactures and the application vendors to 
complement their service provision. The manufactures and application vendors are more direct 
competitors but they also have some degree of market separation. Some manufacturers are fierce 
competitors and would not form alliances within OMA or otherwise with manufacturers they see as 
promoting rival standards. An example is the rivalry between CDMA and GSM manufacturers. 
The OMA members seem to adhere to the insights that you should ally with firms that complement 
you and avoid your closest rivals (Weiss and Sirbu 1990; Besen and Farrell 1994; Axelrod, 
Mitchell et al. 1995). 
Customer relationship 
This factor that influencing OMA members behavior is not often mentioned in the general 
literature. The involvement of buyers in the standardization process is viewed as an important 
factor for the success of an organization by Weiss and Sirbu (1990), but they do not imply that 
companies participate just because the potential buyers are members in the organization. The 
observation that standardization participation by one group of companies is driven by the need to 
create customer relationship and promote themselves towards their peers is interesting. Many 
application vendors view the participation in standardization as a prerequisite for selling products 
to the operators later on. 
Asking the application vendors why they participate in OMA they answer that this is where their 
customers is. They participate to uphold their existing customer relationships and get new 
relationships. Without the participation of the operators the application vendors would turn their 
participation towards other organizations. The fact that the majority of application vendors choose 
associate membership indicates that they are more concerned about their presence than actual 
influence in the direction of the organization.  
Choice of membership strategies 
From the analysis we can see that the different groups have different strategies for their 
participation. The operators need a hand on the strategic direction of OMA and tend to choose full 
or sponsor membership. They also extend their participation in standardization to other 
organizations in the telecommunication field. They have a vertical approach and try to be members 
in all standardization groups within their field. The manufacturers have a similar approach as the 
operators. They too engage in standardization within their field, but they also open up for 
participation in standardization of adjacent value chains. The manufacturers membership strategy 
within OMA are more diversified that the operators. They choose primarily full or sponsor 
membership while small manufacturers choose associate membership. The large manufacturers 
need to vote on technical issues to get the solution their alliance is promoting through. 
The application vendors have another approach towards membership. They choose associate or 
supporter membership, while large application vendors choose full membership. This can be due to 
the fact that they do not need a hand in the direction OMA is going and have no need for voting on 
technical standards. They provide complementary products and will adapt to the standards being 
developed. They can also easier adjust their production since they provide software while the 
manufactures provide hardware. The application vendors have a higher degree of adaptability since 
they work more on the complementary side. They also form alliances with a large number of 
operators and manufactures since companies tend to ally with partners that can complement their 
products (Axelrod, Mitchell et al. 1995) 
The operators and the large manufacturers have a vertical approach where they try to influence 
every part of the value chain/domain they are part of. They would like to control everything from 
the core infrastructure to the services running on top of it and work together in many 
standardization organizations to uphold this control. 
The application vendors have a horizontal approach. The majority of application vendors have no 
hope of dominating the whole value chain they are a part of and rather opt for a part in many 
different value chains. Since their products are more adoptable they tend to be present in 
standardization within more domains/value chains. 
6 CONCLUSION  
The operators are most influenced by time-to-market and choose sponsor and full membership. 
They also participate in standardization activities within their primary domain. They have a vertical 
strategy and try to influence the whole mobile infrastructure. Within OMA they tend to focus on 
the strategic direction of the organization and the quick delivery of standards. 
The manufacturers are most influenced by IPR and choose primarily sponsor or full membership. 
They are more diverse than the operators since many small manufacturers choose an associate 
membership. The manufacturers with sponsor and full membership do as the operators and 
participate in 3GPP and 3GPP2. They also have a vertical strategy and try to influence the whole 
mobile infrastructure. Within OMA they focus on both the strategic direction of OMA and the 
technical content and IPR are more important than time-to-market.  
The application vendors are influenced by customer relationship and IPR and choose a full or 
associate membership. More application vendors choose associate than full membership. The 
application vendors with full membership choose to participate in W3C instead of 3GPP or 3GPP2. 
They choose a vertical strategy focusing on getting their products into different infrastructures. 
Within OMA they focus on customer relationship and getting their specific IPR into the standards. 
They do not only contribute to the technological development of a standard, but by doing so they 
market their competency and solutions towards their largest customer group. Many companies 
view the participation in standardization as a prerequisite for selling products to the operators later 
on. It will be necessary to research this observation further to see if this is valid just for the 
telecommunication domain or is a factor influencing other standardization processes as well. 
All type of companies are concerned with alliance building. The manufacturers and operators look 
towards organizations within their field of operation, the telecommunication sector. They have a 
vertical approach trying to participate in every level of the value chain and control it. The 
application vendors try to broaden their scope, and go outside their home domain. They have a 
horizontal approach trying to be a layer in many different value chains. The difference can be 
explained by what they provide, the operators add buying power and delivery of services, and the 
manufacturers provide the core products for the standards, while the application vendors provide 
complementary products.  
Overall the participants have both a technical and a market perspective on their participation and 
participation in a standardization organization is more than a technical activity.  
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